Repeat offenders are commonly given more severe sentences than first-time offenders for the same violations. Though this practice makes intuitive sense, the theory behind escalating penalties is disputed in both legal and economic theories. Here we investigate folk intuitions concerning the moral and intentional status of actions performed by people with positive versus negative prior records. We hypothesized that prior record would modulate both moral judgment and mental state reasoning. Subjects first engaged in an economic game with fair (positive prior record) and unfair (negative prior record) competitors and then read descriptions of their competitors' actions that resulted in either positive or negative outcomes. The descriptions left the competitors' mental states unstated. We found that subjects judged actions producing negative outcomes as more "intentional" and more "blameworthy" when performed by unfair competitors. Although explicit mental state evaluation was not required, moral judgments in this case were accompanied by increased activation in brain regions associated with mental state reasoning, including predominantly the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). The magnitude of RTPJ activation was correlated with individual subjects' behavioural responses to unfair play in the game. These results thus provide insight for both legal theory and moral psychology.
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Introduction
Repeat offenders commonly receive more severe sentences than first-time offenders for the same violations. This principle of escalating penalties with offense history is widespread in both criminal and civil law, in many countries and over many centuries (Durham, 1987) . Moreover, the practice fits with common sense: intuitively, it seems "right" that persistent offenders receive more severe punishments. Nevertheless, both justice and economic models of the law advocate against escalating penalties. According to the justice model, punishment is justified only if the amount of punishment is proportional to the harm caused by the violation. Escalating penalties violate this rule, punishing repeat offenses disproportionately (Ashworth, 2005; Durham, 1987) . According to the economic model, an optimal punishment regime is one in which the expected punishment for a violation equals the social cost of the violation. Expected punishment is a function of both the penalty once caught, and the probability of being caught. Since repeat offenders are more likely to be caught than first-time offenders, their expected punish- ment escalates even if the amount of the penalty does not (Dana, 2001; Emons, 2007) . In spite of these considerations, legal practice in the US over the past 30 years has tended towards increasing, rather than decreasing, reliance on prior record during sentencing, as in the "Three-Strikes" policy in California (Austin, Clark, Hardyman, & Henry, 2000) . Many efforts have been made to account for this phenomenon (Ashworth, 2005; Dana, 2001) . One theory, for example, treats escalating penalties as deterrence or preventative incapacitation: if the offender is incarcerated, he or she will be less able to commit another offense (Ashworth, 2005 ).
An alternative is that escalating penalties express society's moral condemnation of persistent wrongful action (Dana, 2001; Sunstein, 2005) , regardless of utilitarian calculations. The current study investigates this alternative: do laypersons indeed judge firsttime offenders as less blameworthy, and repeat offenders as more blameworthy, for the same harm caused? How are the effects of prior record related to other aspects of folk morality, such as attribution of intent to moral agents (Cushman, personal communication; Pizarro, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2006; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006) ? Specifically, does negative prior record lead subjects to attribute more intentionality to agents for causing negative outcomes; if so, is this effect a cause or a consequence of a change in moral judgment, i.e. increase in blame.
Consider the following example scenario: Ashley works at the computer help desk and often friends bring their computers. Once,
